

The Social and Cultural Construction of Emotions: The Greek Paradigm
Project funded with an Advanced Investigator Grant by the
European Research Council, 2009-2013
Principal Investigator: Angelos Chaniotis

Emotions in Attic orators: a survey

Researcher: Ed Sanders

Texts:

Demosthenes 20: <i>Against Leptines</i> :	pp. 2-5
Demosthenes 21: <i>Against Meidias</i> :	pp. 6-10
Demosthenes 27: <i>Against Aphobos I</i> :	p. 11
Demosthenes 27: <i>Against Aphobos II</i> :	p. 12
Demosthenes 35: <i>Against Lakritos</i> :	p. 13
Demosthenes 38: <i>Against Nausimachos and Xenopeithes</i> :	p. 14
Demosthenes 42: <i>Against Phainippos</i> :	p.15
Demosthenes 48: <i>Against Olympiodoros</i> :	p. 16
Demosthenes 50: <i>Against Polykles</i> :	p. 17-18
Demosthenes 51: <i>On the Trierarchic Crown</i> :	p. 19
Demosthenes 53: <i>Against Nikostratos</i> :	p. 20
Demosthenes 54: <i>Against Konon</i> :	p. 21
Demosthenes 58: <i>Against Theokrines</i> :	p. 22
Demosthenes 60: <i>Funeral Oration</i> :	p. 23
Dinarchus 1: <i>Against Demosthenes</i> :	p. 24
Dinarchus 2 (<i>Against Aristogeiton</i>) and 3 (<i>Against Philokles</i>):	p. 25
Hyperides 5: <i>Against Demosthenes</i> :	p. 26

Demosthenes 20: *Against Leptines*

Select bibliography

- Cairns, D.L. (2003) 'The Politics of Envy: Envy and Equality in Ancient Greece', in D. Konstan and N.K. Rutter (eds) *Envy, Spite and Jealousy: the Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece* (Edinburgh) 235-252
- Fisher, N. (2003) 'Let Envy Be Absent: Envy, Liturgies and Reciprocity in Athens', in D. Konstan and N.K. Rutter (eds) *Envy, Spite and Jealousy: the Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece* (Edinburgh) 181-215
- Hansen, M.H. (1980) 'Athenian *Nomothesia* in the Fourth Century B.C. and Demosthenes' Speech *Against Leptines*', *Classica et Medievalia* 32, 87-104
- Harris, E.M. (2008) *Demosthenes, Speeches 20-22* (Austin, TX)
- Hesk, J. (2000) *Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens* (Cambridge) 39-51

Summary of the speech

Because Athens was short of funds, Leptines (L.) had proposed a law, passed by the Assembly in 357 BCE, which removed exemptions from performing liturgies from those who (or whose ancestors) had been previously awarded them for some benefaction or service to Athens. Demosthenes (D., the speaker), gives a supporting speech for a proposal to repeal this law, on the basis that it was detrimental to Athens' interests to antagonise these people for relatively small initial monetary gain, and replace it with one which explicitly continued to recognise those past benefactions or services. Since more than two years have passed since the law was enacted, L. is no longer personally liable to prosecution; D. therefore concentrates on the iniquities of the law rather than L.'s faults and conduct. He argues primarily that the law brings shame on the city for showing itself apparently ungrateful to, and envious of, past benefactors. Rich people might indeed deserve envy if they refuse to make part of their wealth available for the good of the whole *polis*; however, by definition this law principally attacks those who have done *most* good for the city, and envy is decidedly *not* the right response. Rather, Athens should take pride in its past achievements, and its present conduct, and show gratitude to those benefactors and their descendants.

Useful passages

[notes based on Harris (2008)]

- 9-14 **pride** in our honest approach, and **shame** at breaking our promises:
- Athenians have legislated against lying in the marketplace – surely we should similarly not show our earlier offers to benefactors were lies? That would be disgraceful
 - it is worth losing money so as not to lose reputation – this is more important to us than money
 - our ancestors likewise cared more about reputation than money: they spent all their money to pursue honour, even their private fortunes
 - this law brings the city disgrace (§10: *aiskhros*; cf. §§9, 54, 60, 62, 71, 88, 117, 134-135, 140 (see below), 157) i.e. **shame** (*aiskhunê*: §§20, 28, 46, 47, 81, 135, 166; *kakia*: §§6, 36, 55, 140, 165; *ponêra doxa*: §50, cf. §§6, 49, 87, 109, 119(x2), 124, 126, 135, 165 (see below), 167) rather than a good reputation, which is not worthy either of your ancestors or you
 - the city appears **envious** (§10: *phthoneros*; cf. §§56, 139-141 (see below), 151, 157, 164, 165; cf. grudge against the rich (*baskainein*): §24; *physeôs kakias*: §140 (see

below)), untrustworthy (§10: *apistos*; cf. §17, 22, 25(x3), 28, 36, 44, 66, 120, 124, 164, 167; leads to others' lack of **confidence**), and ungrateful (§10: *akharistos*; cf. §§17, 26, 39, 43, 46, 55, 66, 71, 81, 113, 119, 121, 156, 158, 159; on how to and not to do favours for benefactors, §§39-40, 56; on amount of **gratitude** in proportion to benefaction: §46)

- anecdote about the democracy repaying debts contracted by the Thirty out of public funds
- if you will give money to those who have wronged you (Spartans) to avoid defaulting on your loan [strictly not the loan of the *dêmos*], you must repeal L.'s law to avoid defaulting on your obligations
- the city's character [note the personification of the city] is honest, virtuous, and concerned with honour rather than money. This law suggests L.'s character is otherwise [though D. immediately qualifies this (in a passive aggressive way), to avoid slandering in a public speech]

31-35 **fear** for the future regarding grain imports:

- if we deprive Leukon [a benefactor, who ruled a region of the Black Sea] of his exemption, we jeopardise Athens' grain supplies for the future; in a year of grain shortage (as two years ago), Athens could run short. Athens relied heavily on grain imported from the Black Sea region; this gave it special interest in military control of the grain route, leading it to a number of political/military decisions, including: forcing several *poleis* into the Delian League (Eion, Skyros and Karystos c.476/5 BCE – Thuc. 1.98); putting down revolt in Thasos in 465 BCE (Thuc. 1.100-1); putting down revolt in Euboia c.447-445 BCE (Thuc. 1.114); attempting to recapture Amphipolis in 422 BCE after its liberation by Brasidas (Thuc. 5.1-11); capitulation to Sparta in 404 BCE after Aigospotamoi; opposition to Philip's encroachment on Thrace after c.350 BCE

68-69 **pride** in our citizens' achievements, and other's **admiration**:

- when one of our citizens benefits another Greek community, Athens wins the admiration of the Greeks

73 **pride** in the achievements of Themistokles in hoodwinking the Spartans (i.e. ancestral pride)

105-111 commendation of 'the ways of Athens', compared with those of Sparta and Thebes; not **pride**, as argument is utilitarian (110: our laws have brought us good fortune)

139-142 **envy** at those with awards:

- if you take away awards with no reason, you will appear envious
- envy is shameful
- envy is an indication of an evil nature
- our city shuns all shameful behaviour, and deserves the charge of envy least of all this is an indication of Athenian civic **pride**:
- only we hold funeral orations, to celebrate the deeds of brave men
- this is because we feel **admiration** for outstanding achievement – people don't do this if they are **envious** of them
- we give generous awards to those who win crowns in athletic contests
- you are not envious of those few, nor do you try to remove their honours
- we surpass all other cities in granting awards

- the awards we give surpass by far the benefits we have received (and that we are giving awards in recognition for)
- our city therefore exhibits justice, virtue and high-mindedness
- this has given us a good reputation for ever

165 *philanthrôpia* set against *phthonos*, *dikaiosynê* against *kakia*, *ta khrêsta* against *ta ponêrotata* in the minds of the jurors

Further notes

Prosecution speech to a people's court, *in propria persona*, 355 BCE.

Emotional community is Athenian (adult male) citizens.

The speech primarily plays on two pairs of contrasted emotion:

- **pride** in the way we do things at Athens (to which Leptines' law runs contrary), vs. **shame** at how others will view us (if Leptines' law is not repealed)
- **gratitude** towards past benefactors and their families and **envy** of wealthy people if they escape future liturgies

Pride vs. shame. The speech takes as a premise that Athenians care about the city's image, how it will look to other Greeks – and it is a safe assumption that this premise is correct. In particular, the speaker argues that they should not want to appear a) envious (or spiteful), b) untrustworthy, and c) ungrateful, and they would appear all these things if they go back on a promise. Being these things would be d) disgraceful, e) shameful, f) evil, and g) of base repute. These seven words or phrases recur a number of times in the speech.

Demosthenes chooses not to slander his opponent openly, this not being a forensic speech but rather a deliberative one, and the proposer no longer being liable to prosecution (because two years had passed since the law was enacted, and the new law was not contrary to ancestral laws, merely inexpedient). However, by constantly referring to "Leptines' law" (instead of "your law" or "this law"), Demosthenes associates Leptines personally with the seven charges, rather than the entire *dêmos*, and by thus blackening his opponent's character is better able to persuade Athenians to disassociate themselves with Leptines' law by reversing it. (Cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1.2.1356a13 to the effect that a speaker's character (*êthos*) is his strongest rhetorical weapon.)

Gratitude. The speech has a goodly amount to say about the general reasons Athens chose to honour individual citizens (generally by exemption from liturgies, for them and their descendants), and individual non-citizens (generally with a grant of citizenship, combined with exemptions from liturgies rich citizens would have to perform; exemption for descendants would presumably not be an issue as their wives and hence children would be non-citizens), and also gives some specific examples of both non-citizens and citizens who have been honoured, and why. This shows the kinds of act Athenians particularly value: in general someone going beyond the call of duty in financial or military service to the city. This tendency to award honours is frequently contrasted with Sparta's and Thebes' (the two other strongest contemporary *poleis*) disinclination to honour citizens or non-citizens.

Envy. Envy is considered a base emotion, and pretty much uniquely so. Arist. *Rh.* 2.11.1388a36 describes it as “a base feeling of base people” (*phaulon kai phaulôn*), the only one of fifteen named emotions in that treatise to be so labelled, and Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 2.6.1107a says it is one of three emotions that indicate “baseness” (*meta tês phaulotêtos*), alongside shamelessness (*anaiskhuntia*) and spite (*epikhairekakia*); shamelessness also being a frequent referent in this speech. Aristotle is not alone in his view of envy: among contemporaries, Aeschines and Demosthenes link it to bad character (Aeschin. 2.22.10: *kakoêtheia*; Dem. 18.11.1: *kakoêthês*), and in this speech Demosthenes says it is a sign of an evil nature (Dem. 20.140.3: *physeôs kakias sêmeion*). Interestingly, in *Against Meidias*, Demosthenes calls on the jury to respond to his opponent with (anger, hatred and) envy (Dem. 21.196.6); we can infer that envy is perhaps not totally base, providing it is directed at those who truly deserve it – in that case, someone committing violence against someone performing a public liturgy, and by extension (argues Demosthenes) against the whole *dêmos*. Envy therefore should not be directed against the wealthy inasmuch as they are wealthy, but only if they act in other ways that deserve it. Clearly, in *Against Leptines*, those wealthy people who have benefited the city do *not* deserve it, and so envy is shameful.

Demosthenes 21: *Against Meidias*

Select bibliography

- Cairns, D.L. (2003b) 'The Politics of Envy: Envy and Equality in Ancient Greece', in D. Konstan and N.K. Rutter (eds) *Envy, Spite and Jealousy: the Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece* (Edinburgh) 235-252
- Fisher, N. (1992) *Hybris* (Warminster)
- Fisher, N. (2003) 'Let Envy Be Absent: Envy, Liturgies and Reciprocity in Athens', in D. Konstan and N.K. Rutter (eds) *Envy, Spite and Jealousy: the Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece* (Edinburgh) 181-215
- Harris, E.M. (1989) 'Demosthenes' Speech *Against Meidias*', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 92, 117-136
- Harris, E.M. (2008) *Demosthenes, Speeches 20-22* (Austin, TX)
- Kurihara, A. (2003) 'Personal Enmity as a Motivation in Forensic Speeches', *Classical Quarterly* 53, 464-477
- MacDowell, D.M. (1990) *Demosthenes: Against Meidias (Oration 21)* (Oxford)
- Ober, J. (1989) *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People* (Princeton) 207-11, 215-220
- Rubinstein, L. (2004) 'Stirring up Dicastic Anger', in D.L. Cairns and R.A. Knox (eds) *Law, Rhetoric, and Comedy in Classical Athens: Essays in Honour of Douglas M. MacDowell* (Swansea) 187-203
- Wilson, P. (1991) 'Demosthenes 21 (*Against Meidias*): Democratic Abuse', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 37, 164-195

Summary of the speech

Demosthenes (D., the speaker), a rich politician, was struck in the face by Meidias (M.) while in the performance of a liturgy (specifically, a *choregia*: paying for and directing a chorus in the City Dionysia festival). This blow was the culmination of a quarrel that D. alleges dated back some years. D. initially had a motion of censure passed against M. by the Assembly. He later prosecuted M., probably for insolent violence (*hybris*). This is his prosecution speech, given to a people's court, *in propria persona*, c.347 BCE; the emotional community therefore is Athenian (adult male) citizens. D. argues that M., a very wealthy man, habitually mistreats and shows his contempt for poorer men by all sorts of violent acts, and has not performed the liturgies owed by a man of his wealth. He further argues that M.'s striking of a citizen, particularly one in the process of performing a magistracy, was a blow struck against all citizens. D. seeks to forestall any pity in the jury that M. will try to arouse for himself, and instead arouse their anger, hatred and envy against M. (D. says explicitly that they should feel these emotions for M.). A variety of penalties are available, including death; Demosthenes calls for the death penalty, else confiscation of all M's property (§152).

Passages for analysis

[notes based on Harris (2008)]

1-2 brings up many of the themes to be pursued throughout the speech:

- M.'s behaviour towards D. involved bullying (*aselgeia*; *-selg-* stem occurs 18 times in the speech) and violent arrogance (*hybris*; *hybr-* stem occurs 131 times in the speech)
- he struck me a direct blow (*plêgas*; *plêg-* stem occurs 8 times in the speech), but also committed many other acts of violence (*biaia*; *bia-* stem occurs 20 times in the speech) towards me ...
- ... while I was performing a liturgy for the city
- you voted against him in a motion of censure (a *probole*, which D. brought before the Assembly) ...
- ... because you were **angry** (*ôrgisthê*; the people's (past) *orgê* is also referred to at §§6, 36, 175, 183, 215, 226; D.'s *orgê* is referred to at §§15, 73, 76, 123; D. tries to arouse further popular *orgê* against M. at §§34, 42, 43, 46, 100, 108, 123, 127, 147, 183, 186, 196, 222) and **furious** (*parônxyntê*; the people's *paroxynô* occurs nowhere else) and **zealous** on my behalf (*espoudasen*; the people's past *spoudê* is also referred to at §61; D. tries to arouse further popular *spoudê* on his behalf at §213; M. will try to arouse it on his own behalf at §195); he also later refers to the people's *aganaktêsis* (§§6, 15, 123; cf. §39 when they did not feel it), and his own (§108, 123, 129)
- and you did not let yourself be bribed by him
- moreover, after the *probole*, many of you encouraged me to bring a full case against him for *hybris* (the *graphê hybreos*, which could carry the penalty of an unlimited fine, exile, or death)
- because a) you thought I had **suffered** (*peponthenai*) terrible things, and b) you wanted to punish him for being over-bold (*thrasyn*), brutal (*bdelyron*), and unrestrained (*oude kathekton*)

42-43 discusses the appropriate amount of **anger** the jurors should feel:

- those who commit offences deliberately and through *hybris* deserve more *orgê* than those who do so otherwise
- compare: restitution for property damage is for the cost of the damage if accidental, but for twice that if deliberate
- compare: those who kill accidentally have the chance to be pardoned and get sympathy, but those who kill deliberately are punished with death or exile

71-74 D. compares his own moderate response to that of one Euaion, who was struck by someone called Boiotos, and struck a blow back in retaliation, killing Boiotos. When one is struck, one is not enraged by the blow, but rather by all the things done by the striker to insult [quoted directly from Harris (2008)]:

- the way he stands
- the way he looks
- his tone of voice
- when he strikes to insult
- when he acts like an enemy
- when he punches
- when he strikes him in the face

Such things stir one up (*kinei*) and derange one (*existêsin*) (§72).

Euaion was struck by an acquaintance, who was drunk, in front of friends, when he was somewhere voluntarily (a party). D. was struck by an enemy, who was sober, in front of all sorts, when he was somewhere he was forced to be (the chorus pit). Even Euaion was convicted by one vote; therefore D.'s restraint should all the more invite the jurors to pitch in on his side. This passage makes use of the Greek binary opposition between friends

and enemies, seeking to turn a majority of jurors into 'friends' who will take D.'s part in this quarrel. D. restrained his (very natural) anger at the time, and so can all the more so demand jurors' anger on his behalf now.

95-100 D. compares M. with Strato (S.) [a citizen who was once selected to adjudicate a minor matter between D. and M., decided in favour of D. when M. did not show up, and whom M. later got disenfranchised in revenge – §§83-87; D. puts his slant on M.'s actions at §§88-93]. He argues that S. is owed the jury's **pity**, but M. is not (§§95-96, 99-100):

- S. served on military campaigns (M. has always attempted to avoid it – §133), and had never done anything wrong, but being poor and isolated (not being a public figure, he had no political allies), was taken advantage of by M. with his wealth and arrogance
- if S. had allowed himself to be bribed by M., he would not have been disenfranchised by him (i.e. he was punished for being honest)
- this good, honest person has fallen into misfortune because of M.'s injustice
- M. will call for the jurors' **pity**, by bringing his children into the court (supposedly a common ploy), by weeping, and by calling for acquittal
- but one should pity people for injustice they cannot endure, not for a just punishment (cf. Arist. *Rh.* 2.8.1385b13-14 on pity being a response to undeserved misfortune)
- as M. showed no pity for S.'s children, so jurors should show no pity for M.'s children
- M. on the other hand deserves popular **hatred** (§§97-98):
- he is cruel and insensitive, he inflicts huge punishments for invented injustices, and commits violent abuse against citizens
- he shows no consideration for the festival (the City Dionysia), the sacred rites, or the law
- he is abusive and disgusting, and such men deserve hatred
- he is wealthy (see below), and this is the reason for his insolence (M's wealth also connected to his hybriatic behaviour at §§20, 66, 109, 138)
- therefore he should have his wealth (that makes him abusive) taken away, rather than continue able to use it to bribe jurors to acquit him (D. further alleges at §103 that M. also uses his wealth to hire others to initiate unsubstantiated, malicious prosecutions) – if he retains them, he will use these assets against *you*, i.e. against your (the city's) interests
- this section is quite separate from D.'s private enmity (discussed at §§77ff.) – while many of the reasons for D.'s private anger are grounds for popular anger too, D.'s private reasons for enmity cannot be given as grounds for popular hatred (Kurihara 2003, Rubinstein 2004)

D. creates the contrast between the good citizen and the bad one; the former deserves pity, but the latter hatred. This antithesis, presented together in one passage (the sections on pity surround those on hatred), is interesting in light of Aristotle's insistence on indignation and envy as the opposite emotions to pity (Arist. *Rh.* 2.9.1387a3-5, 2.9.1387b17-21, 2.10.1388a27-30). While D. tries to arouse these emotions elsewhere in the speech, it is hatred that is contrasted here with pity, suggesting that Aristotle's theoretical analysis is out of line with real-life oratory.

194-196 D. weaves a contrast between M.'s previously **arrogant** behaviour, and the **pity** he asks for now:

- he describes M. attempting to intimidate the jury in the past, by insults, threats, and looks

- but now he is trying to elicit their pity, through tears. D. asks rhetorically if M. will also ask the jury to pity his children
- M. is full of arrogance: he struts around, with an entourage, wealth, and abuse – but then demands pity when he is on trial
- D. mocks him, saying if he achieved it, M. would simultaneously have achieved resentment (*phthonos*) for his lifestyle and pity for his beguilement
D.says the jury should not feel **pity** for M., but rather three other emotions: **hatred** (*misos*), **envy** (*phthonos*), and **anger** (*orgê*)
- for further notes to this section, see below

Further notes

The speech primarily tries to arouse three emotions in the jury:

- **anger** at M.'s *hybris*, as it is (allegedly) aimed against the whole city
- **hatred** because of M.'s (alleged) enmity for the city
- **envy** at M.'s wealth, because (allegedly) it is not used for the good of the city

Hybris and attendant behaviour. D. describes the ways in which M. harassed him: he opposed military exemptions for members of D.'s chorus, and stood for election as supervisor for the Dionysia (§15); he damaged the chorus' clothing and adornments (§16); he corrupted the chorus' trainer, corrupted the Archon (who selected the judges), and tried to blockade my chorus in their rehearsal rooms (§17); and he struck a blow against D. (§18; also §1 *et al.*), and prevented the winning tribe from winning (§18). These insults, inasmuch as they are private, arouse **private anger** in D. (cf. Arist. *Rh.* 2.2.1378b10-15, 23-26 on *hybris* leading to *orgê*). However, D. argues that M's (alleged) actions in §§16-17 and the blow he struck, since they were aimed at someone in the course of performing a liturgy for the city, were thus acts of *hybris* committed against the city as a whole, and thus deserving of the **anger of the whole city** (§§31-34). He further argues that acts of violence are always considered to be acts against the whole community, hence the fine always goes to the city (§§44-46).

Uses of, and responses to, wealth. **Envy** is considered a base emotion, and pretty much uniquely so. Arist. *Rh.* 2.11.1388a36 describes it as "a base feeling of base people" (*phaulon kai phaulôn*), the only one of fifteen named emotions in that treatise to be so labelled, and Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 2.6.1107a says it is one of three emotions that indicate "baseness" (*meta tês phaulotêtos*), alongside shamelessness (*anaiskhuntia*) and spite (*epikhairekakia*); shamelessness also being a frequent referent in this speech. Aristotle is not alone in his view of envy: among contemporaries, Aeschines and Demosthenes link it to bad character (Aeschin. 2.22.10: *kakoêtheia*; Dem. 18.11.1: *kakoêthês*), and in *Against Leptines* Demosthenes says it is a sign of an evil nature (Dem. 20.140.3: *physeôs kakias sêmeion*). Interestingly, in *Against Meidias*, Demosthenes calls on the jury to respond to his opponent with (anger, hatred and) envy (Dem. 21.196); we can infer that envy is perhaps not totally base, providing it is directed at those who truly deserve it – in that case, someone committing violence against someone performing a public liturgy, and by extension (argues Demosthenes) against the whole *dêmos*. Envy therefore should not be directed against the wealthy inasmuch as they are wealthy, but only if they act in other ways that deserve it. Since Meidias has only used his wealth for anti-social purposes (e.g. bribery, hiring false prosecutors), and avoided the uses he should properly have put his wealth to (i.e. liturgies), he deserves envy and should have his wealth stripped from him. D. prepares the way well: he mentions M.'s (and his friends') wealth and links it with his arrogance and other inappropriate behaviour at a number of places (§§20, 66, 96-98 (see

above), 109, 138), and several times he makes general comments to the effect that bad behaviour resulting from wealth deserves punishment (§§98 (see above), 124, 143); he discusses Meidias' inappropriate use of his wealth in a long section (§§151-74), deriding the small number of liturgies he has performed, and explaining why such liturgies as he has done should not be taken into account. Only after this long build-up does Demosthenes finally draw on his earlier allusions to the appropriate response, and call for the audience's *phthonos* (§196: at Meidias' lifestyle and conduct) to accompany their *orgê* (called for at §§34, 42-43 (see above), 46, 100, 108, 123, 127, 147, 183, 186, 196, 222) and *misos* (called for at §§97-98).

Demosthenes 27: *Against Aphobos I*

Lawcourt prosecution speech, 364/3 BCE. Demosthenes (D.) prosecutes his guardians (Aphobos (A.) and another man) for squandering his inheritance. D. asks explicitly for the jury's **pity** for himself, and tries to awaken **indignation**, and possibly also a deeper (unnamed) **hostility** for Aphobos (A.).

- 63-67 D. calls for pity for himself, based on accepted values:
- D. exaggerates the situation, raising the issue of being orphaned at the age of 1 (rather than 7) – and extrapolating to say what little remains of his father's estate would have been used up. Then A. may have let him starve...
 - even the wives and children of convicted criminals are pitied (i.e. so much more so should he and his sister and mother be pitied)
 - those who should have been our friends and relatives have acted as enemies
 - I am the most miserable (*talaipōrotatos*) of men
 - I cannot provide a dowry for my sister
 - I cannot manage for myself
 - I am expected to perform liturgies (specifically the *eisphora* – war tax), as the estate was large, but cannot
 - losing this case will bankrupt me – which will mean I will be disenfranchised as well as my patrimony
 - pity me
 -
- D. calls for **indignation** (*diaganaktein*) against A. and his fellow guardian:
- they have paid over only a small part of what was left them to administer – plus they have given me debts to pay off
 - recapitulation of the actualities of the financial misappropriation
 - they have treated us with *hybris* (Arist. *Rh.* 2.2.1378b10-15, 23-26 suggests the response to *hybris* is **anger** (*orgê*) – confirmed by Dem. 21, where D. calls for public *orgê* against his opponent whose *hybris* was committed against the city)
- D. also appears to be trying to arouse another emotion against A., through discussion of liturgies – i.e. the public use to which D. could put his money:
- other guardians double/triple the estates they manage, so liturgies can be performed from them
 - my estate used to perform liturgies and make large contributions to the *eisphora*, but now cannot make small ones...
 - ... because of their shameless behaviour (*anaiskhyntia*)
 - (recap) my father left me sufficient property for *eisphora*, but these men have taken it

Demosthenes 28: *Against Aphobos II*

Lawcourt prosecution speech, 364/3 BCE. Demosthenes (D.) prosecutes his guardians (Aphobos (A.) and another man) for squandering his inheritance (follow-up speech to Dem. 27). D. explains his private **indignation**, and attempts to arouse general **resentment** in the jury for his opponents, and **pity** for himself.

- 18-24 D. explicitly calls for public **resentment/envy** (*phthonos*):
- we know this is public, as he calls for pity alongside it (see below)
 - can be contrasted with D.'s private **indignation** (§1: *aganakteô*)
 - to arouse this resentment/envy D. says that A. is wealthy (owns more than 10 talents) in his own right – and on top of wealth has behaved wrongly in taking D.'s money (c.f. comments on wealth *plus* misbehaviour leading to envy in Dem. 21)
 - (note: now only one liturgist available to the city where there were two before – left implicit)
 - A. has not performed any liturgies, nor will he if he keeps my property hidden (**gratitude** vs. **envy** – see Dem. 20)
- D. asks for **pity**:
- he has been deprived of his patrimony (note: squandering one's own patrimony brings disapproval (e.g. Aeschin. 1))
 - I have nowhere else to turn but the *dêmos*
 - my mother, my sister, and myself will **suffer** (*paskhô* – root occurs at §§18, 20)
 - my sister should have a dowry; my mother should have a husband
 - pity me, as my relatives have not. I beg you by your own children, and wives, and the good things you have (implicit: but I do not)
 - do not let my mother be deprived of her remaining hopes, and suffer: she will be broken if I am disenfranchised and my sister does not get a husband (because no dowry)
- D. frequently mentions justice/desert – *nemesis*? or connected to *phthonos*?:
- I have been wronged and am seeking justice
 - your *phthonos* (see above) will be just
 - we (my mother, sister and I) do not deserve to suffer
 - my mother's fate is unworthy
 - I do not deserve to be denied justice
 - A. does not deserve to keep *so much* money (see *phthonos* above) unjustly
- D. looks for their **gratitude** in advance:
- my father performed many liturgies, and so will I if you give me my money back – and remember A. has not done (see above)
 - I will *willingly* perform liturgies through **gratitude** towards you – the emotion is reciprocal

Demosthenes 35: *Against Lakritos*

Private lawcourt speech. Androkles (A.) prosecuted Lakritos (L.) for repayment of a loan made to L.'s brother (now deceased) against a cargo; L. counter-indicted that, as he was not party to the loan agreement, which was in any case verbal, A. was prosecuting him under the wrong legal procedure; this is A.'s defence speech to the counter-indictment. L. (a resident alien) was a rhetorician by profession, and A. attempts to arouse hostility in the jury against him on this account.

- 38-43 A. covertly attempts to arouse the audience's hostility to L., partly through labelling him and making use of popular mistrust of / **hostility** to sophists, partly through describing L.'s supposed unpleasant emotions:
- L. is a rogue, a sophist, and unjust (*adikos*)
 - these sophists pay cash to Isokrates (for education)
 - these people are **contemptuous** (*kataphroneô*) of others and consider themselves clever (*deinos*)
 - they should not **covet** (*ephiemai*) and take away others' property
 - this is the mark of a base (*ponêros*) sophist
 - he believes he can manipulate you through words (*logoi*) and mislead (*paragô*) you because he is clever (*deinos*), and has students, and charges money for this
 - repeated use of "training" (*paideuein, epaideusen, paideuontos, paideuomenôn*) (as opposed to honest A. who is not trained to mislead), and repeat use of *ponêros* (and *ponêroteros*), *adikos, deinos, legein*
 - there is also frequent use of the verb trust (*pisteuô*) and cognates
- A. portrays himself, on the contrary, as a simple, bluff, honest trader – by liberal use of strong language and oaths

Demosthenes 38: *Against Nausimachos and Xenopeithes*

Private lawcourt speech. Many years after settling a court case with their now-deceased guardian Aristaikhmos (A.) over the value of the estate he had been managing in their minority, Nausimachos (N.) and Xenopeithes (X.) sued A.'s sons for money supposedly recovered from a debt that allegedly also formed part of their inheritance (i.e. which A. should have passed on to them). The sons (including the speaker in this speech) defended themselves on the grounds that a) N. and X. had settled with A. so issues surrounding their inheritance were closed, and b) there was a 5 year limit for bringing a case which had passed many years ago.

25-27 in this passage we see two issues discussed:

- gratitude for liturgies performed (cf. Dem. 20, 28)
- the squandering of patrimonies / inheritances (cf. Dem 27, 28)

gratitude for liturgies performed:

- my opponents will talk about their trierarchies and the money they have spent on you (suggests it is a *topos* for rich litigants to get the jury onside)
- they are lying: they spent much of it on themselves, and only a little on the city
- therefore I do not believe they deserve gratitude (*kharis*) from you
- you *should* show gratitude to those who perform liturgies for you

the squandering of patrimonies / inheritances:

- those who deserve most gratitude are those who a) do what is most useful for the affairs of the city, and b) do what no one would say is disgraceful (*aiskhros*, i.e. brings **shame**) or blameworthy (*oneidos*, i.e. deserves **indignation**)
- therefore those (implicitly: like our opponents – *praeteritio*) who have done liturgies but then squandered the rest of their money, will defame the city, since they will blame the city rather than themselves for their ruin; but those (explicitly: like ourselves) who have do what is instructed readily, and nurture the rest of their money wisely, are likely a) to do more for the city in future, and b) do so without bringing reproach (*oneidos*) onto you
- the argument is highly tendentious, but plays to the *dêmos*' dislike of those who squander their patrimonies (cf. Aeschin. 1; cf. also Lys. 27.1-2, where the jury is encouraged to feel *phthonos* – plays into the idea that envy/resentment is appropriate for those who have money *and* do something inappropriate with it – see Dem. 21)
- my opponents have wasted their money **shamefully** (*aiskhrôs*) through feasting (lit. devouring, raising the image again of devouring the inheritance) and drunkenness with [and he names two other men, who were possibly well-known for such behaviour]

my opponents will also try to awaken your **pity** by weeping:

- but for men who have squandered as above, this too is **shameful** (*aiskhros* – note the frequent repetition of this word)

Demosthenes 42: *Against Phainippos*

Private lawcourt speech. The speaker, who was formerly rich and in the class of 300 who performed liturgies, has fallen on hard times. He challenges Phainippos (Ph.), whom he claims is richer, either to take on his liturgies or to exchange property with him (under the *antidosis* procedure).

- 22-25 the speaker attempts to arouse gratitude towards himself for past services rendered, and an unnamed hostility against Ph. for having plenty of money but not performing liturgies with it (by comparison with Dem. 21 we can say this is **resentment/phthonos**):
- I inherited a small estate; he inherited two large ones (from his natural and adoptive fathers), which previously performed liturgies
 - the speaker says “I do not begrudge (*phthonō*)” Ph.’s inheritance – thus lodging (the bad form of – i.e envy, grudging) *phthonos* in the audience’s mind at the appropriate juncture, but (a necessary rhetorical stance) dissociating himself from this bad emotion
 - he reminds them of Ph.’s two estates, and claims Ph. has never spent a penny on liturgies; he has learned how to hide his money away, and how to shirk, and everything but how to perform liturgies – whereas I have spent on them
 - Ph. is ambitious (*pephilotimēmenon* – *philotimia* should be a love for the honour (*timē*) of one’s fellow-citizens) for breeding horses (a classic sign of the aristocrat – only the very wealthy had stud farms [Murray, Loeb p.47 note a])
 - he has sold his warhorse (his ability to render military assistance to the city), but bought a chariot to be conveyed about it (all normal citizens had to walk)
 - he sarcastically raises the suggestion of Ph. being useful (to the city) and ambitious (for it), before dismissing the idea
 - he says the juryman is *kalōn ... kagathōn* – a phrase normally associated with aristocrats [should be considered alongside the mention of horses and chariots – he is pressing all the buttons to imply Ph. is behaving as an unpatriotic (and anti-democratic) aristocrat]
 - finally he reminds the jury of his own spending on the city when he was wealthy, and urges them not to allow Ph. to run away (the imagery of the cowardly citizen in war – goes with selling his war-horse)

Demosthenes 48: *Against Olympiodoros*

Private lawcourt speech. Kallistratos (K.) sues Olympiodoros (O.), who had been awarded the estate of Komon, on the grounds that he (K.) was a closer relative to Komon than Olympiodoros. K. was directly related to Komon. O. claims that his mother was related to Komon, so he should inherit, and evidently a jury had previously agreed as he was initially awarded the estate.

6 K. asked O. to help him with the arrangements for burial of Komon, when O. made the claim about his mother, and demanded a share of the estate. K. reacts with anger (*ôrgisthên*) and indignation (*êganaktêsa*).

Aristotle argues (*Rh.* 2.2.1378a30-32, 178b) that *orgê* is a desire for revenge for a belittlement, and that can be either contempt (*kataphronêsis*) for someone we think of no account, a disinterested spitefulness (*epêreasmós*), or violent insult (*hybris*). Clearly O.'s demand (if a lie as K. claims) is none of those things, and this is evidence against Aristotle's limited definition of *orgê*. K.'s initial reaction would (if his claim that O. is lying is correct) have been "You liar, you don't deserve half the estate", hence the situation, especially as it turns out, is closer to one Aristotle describes as giving rise to *to nemesan* (indignation): that someone has (or in this case is trying to obtain) some good that they do not deserve (*Rh.* 2.9.1386b8-11). *Orgê* is presented here, therefore, as a response to someone trying to obtain something that is rightfully yours. Given Greek propensity for coupling near-synonyms, this is an indication that *aganakteô* also implies such a response. This is a personal response: the audience would not be expected to share it, and K. does not ask them to – different from an action that can be presented as affecting all citizens, e.g. *hybris* (Dem. 21) or battery (Dem. 54), when the plaintiff can invite / incite the audience to share his emotion.

No doubt K. would have felt envy/*phthonos* ("he has something and I want it") too, but would certainly not admit this – *phthonos* is never admitted unless it implies justified resentment). Here K. does indeed have reasons for justified resentment, but since he also has reasons for envy he cannot use the word *phthonos* without alerting the audience that he may just be coveting O.'s inheritance. (Compare Dem. 21 and Lys. 27-29: in Dem. 21 he is clearly asking for justified resentment and clearly not asking for envy, so can call for *phthonos*; in Lys. 27-29 the speakers are trying to arouse both, so cannot call for *phthonos*, but must arouse them by other means.

28 Compare O.'s indignation (*êganaktei, aganaktôn*), reported by K., when the estate was initially awarded to someone else: he felt he had lost something he deserved. K. here inadvertently provides evidence that O. did believe his own claim: it wasn't spurious.

Demosthenes 50: *Against Polykles*

Private lawcourt speech. At the end of Apollodoros (A.)'s trierarchy (a liturgy involving outfitting a trireme, and paying and maintaining the crew for a set period), when Polykles (P.) was due to take it over, P. did not turn up. He subsequently refused to take it over in front of witnesses, merely laughing at A.'s attempts and mocking his heritage (as son of a slave turned citizen). A. was forced to continue paying and maintaining the crew, and incurred significant extra expenditure. Here he sues P. to recover this money.

57-64 in this passage A. tries to position himself and P. emotionally with respect to the audience, aiming to arouse:

- their **gratitude** and **pity** for himself
- an unnamed **hostility** for P.

to arouse their pity (*eleêsaî*) he mentions:

- that his mother was dying while he was away on this service to Athens, and died shortly after his return
- his wife was sick for much of his absence too
- his small children (presumably pitiable in themselves)
- he was in difficult financial straits, partly because of his inordinate outlay for the city; also a poor harvest (due to lack of rain, causing wells to dried up) – and his creditors started calling in loans
- he paints a vivid picture of receiving all this financial and personal news by letter, telling of his own tears at not being with his family at this difficult time, and his hopes of finding his dying mother still alive

to win their gratitude (*charin*):

- he summarises what he has explained in detail, as to his performance of P.'s trierarchy as well as his own
- mentions that he sent grain to Athens out of his own pocket (as a gift)
- did everything requested by the general and more, including putting his own life at risk on the expedition
- despite the difficult personal situation outlined above
- and reminds them that if the *dêmos* do not show gratitude for people such as him, no one will be ambitious for their honour (*philotimeisthai*) – competition among the nobility and/or wealthy was long-standing, and under the democracy it was turned into competition to please the *dêmos* (Ober 1989; Whitehead 1983; cf. the *chorêgia* = actual competition)

to arouse their hostility, in order for them to punish him (or rather take revenge: *timôrêsasthai, timôrian*):

- he has previously described in detail all P.'s failures to perform his trierarchy
- he talks of P.'s contempt (*katêphronêsen*) for the *dêmos*
- describes P.'s behaviour as injustice (*emoi adikoimenôî*)
- and asks for revenge, both for himself, and for the whole *dêmos*
- describes men like P. as base (*tois ponêrois*)

What hostile emotion(s) is A. trying to arouse? The case for each contender:

- a) anger / *orgê* : this is the general 'punishing' emotion (it is frequently called for). Arist. *Rh.* 2.2.1378a30-32 describes *orgê* as desire for revenge (*timôrias*) for a belittlement, one of whose types is contempt / *kataphronêsis* (2.2.1378b14-17). [Another type of belittlement is

hybris (2.2.1378b23-25), and laughing at someone is a type of *hybris* (1379a30-32), though this is a personal belittlement of A. and should not motivate the jury (except, perhaps, inasmuch as the *dêmos* voted A.'s father's citizenship.) However, the audience were not Aristotelians, and may not have known words like *timôria* and *kataphronêsis* were supposed to be arousers of *orgê*, and A. does not explicitly ask for *orgê*, which is odd if that were the emotion he was aiming for – speakers frequently do ask for this emotion – see e.g. Allen 2000, 147-51. Rubinstein 2004, however, argues that such calls are rare in private (as opposed to public) cases where any damages payable are not due to the city; interestingly (she says) *orgê* is called for in most speeches in which *timôria* is called for. However, it does not seem to be here – A. refers to the *dêmos*' hypothetical *orgê* were he not to have continued his trierarchy (§67), but does not explicitly call for it against P (though it is suggested by juxtaposition of the two halves of the sentence).

- b) hatred / *misos* : generally called for against individuals who can be presented as part of a class of person that is (rhetorically presented as) antithetical to the interests of the *dêmos* (e.g. sycophants, flatterers, etc.), rather than against individual situations. A. does not label P., except as *ponêros*.
- c) indignation / *aganaktêsis* : never called for in lawcourt speeches; rather it usually applies to personal injury (alternative to *orgê*), and lacks an implication of lack of desert (see below).
- d) indignation / *to nemesan* : does not really exist outside Aristotle, it's place being taken in real life by...
- e) resentment / *phthonos* : generally considered a base emotion (i.e. envy), its moral version is called for a handful of times in the oratorical corpus against people committing offences involving abuse of money or political power (the topics Arist. *Rh.* 2.9.1387a8-13 says are the province of *to nemesan*; cf. [Arist.] *Rh. Al.* 34.1440a35-39, 36.1445a12-26 where *phthonos* includes indignation and is suggested to orators as an alternative to *orgê* or *misos* for arousal in the jury). Aristotle's *to nemesan* refers to possessing something that is not deserved (2.9.1386b9-11), and one assumes this would equally apply to moral *phthonos*. Here does P. have something he does not deserve? Arguably, the portion of his property that should have been spent on the trierarchy. In Dem. 20, *phthonos* (envy) is stated to be inappropriate for rich people avoiding liturgies (through legal exemption) who have been benefactors of the city – suggests *phthonos* is appropriate if they do not so use their money.

Demosthenes 51: *On the Trierarchic Crown*

Speech to the Council. The Council announced a crown for the trierarchy whose ship was first ready. The speaker (Sp.) claims that his was ready first, though someone else (Op.), who sub-contracted his obligation to provide a trireme, has produced several witnesses that his ship was ready before Sp.'s. Sp. argues that, just because someone produces lots of witnesses/supporters, it does not make their version true – though he provides little evidence in his own support beyond one witness/supporter (before the Council, only men of the Council could speak on someone's behalf). His other arguments mainly involve a) attacking Op.'s witnesses/supporters, and b) playing on his audience's latent hostility towards those who sub-contract their responsibilities (since, on a past occasion when the fleet had been defeated, liturgists who subcontracted had been punished more than those who performed their liturgies themselves).

- 9-10 Sp. attempts to rouse the audience's **anger** at Op.:
- those who subcontracted before were punished (while those who did not, were not)
 - they were imprisoned, and only escaped death because your anger (*orgên*) was measured
 - the act was wickedness (*ponêrias*), and Op. committed the same act
 - the time to be angry (*chalepainein*) is not once we have lost a battle (sc. because of Op.'s negligence) but now
 - you should censure (*epitimêsêi*) them
- Sp. describes/asserts Op.'s emotions:
- he is not fearful of punishment (lit. "shivering" – a symptom of **fear**) – which he should be (see above)
 - they are acting out of **greed** (*aischrokerdian* – lit. base covetousness; cf. §11; cf. *pleonexia* – §22)
 - [§22 – whereas they should act out of love of honour (*philotimian*)]

It is notable (in line with Rubinstein 2004's arguments) that in Dem. 51 there is an open call for anger, as the awarding of a crown is a public act by the Council, whereas in Dem. 50 there is not, as the case (though caused by a public matter) is a private lawsuit for damages payable only to the speaker.

Demosthenes 53: *Against Nikostratos*

Private lawcourt speech. Apollodoros (A.) had a long-running feud with Nikostratos (N.) and his brother Arethousios (Ar.), due to the brothers' desire not to pay back a large sum A. had lent them; they had accordingly joined with A.'s enemies in a prosecution, broken into his house, stolen some property, damaged other property, and physically attacked him. At one point Ar. falsely bore witness A. had received a summons to court (where A. was fined in his absence), and A. successfully prosecuted Ar. for bearing that witness falsely. Ar.'s penalty was to pay a large fine, but he claimed he had little property. In this case, N. claimed that two slaves were his, and A. prosecutes N. to show that they are in reality Ar.'s, and hence the property of the city.

- 1-3 A. discusses his reasons for prosecuting:
- it is not *sykophantia* – malicious prosecution by someone not personally involved (frequently for a share of monetary damages or to further a political career)
 - rather it is because he was wronged (*adikoumenos*) and insulted with violence (*hybrizomenos* – see §17) and seeks revenge (*timôreisthai*; cf. §§ 2, 15) – note Arist. *Rh.* 2.2.1378b23-25 gives *hybris* as one of three types of belittlement causing *orgê*, and 2.2.1378a30-32 gives *orgê* as a desire for *timôria*. [To consider: is *orgê* the emotion aroused by a desire for justice (*dikê*), or would that be indignation – note (in context of Arist. *Rh.* 2.9. that *to nemesan* refers to something owned but not deserved, and that might be argued here to apply to the slaves]
 - he feels enmity (*echthra*) for them
 - he is angry (*orgizesthai* – see above) – but his audience will forgive that under the circumstances

It is noteworthy that it was perfectly acceptable to admit personal motivations such as anger and hatred for bringing prosecutions; indeed these were preferable to no personal motivation, given the democratic-ideological dislike of *sykophantoi* (Christ 1998, Christ 2008, Fisher 2008; *contra* Osborne 1990).

Note: at §18 and §§23-24 A. seems to be going out of his way not to usurp the prerogatives of the *dêmos*, in ways which might incur *phthonos*. This is relevant given:

- 26-29 A. appears to be trying to arouse the audience's *phthonos* against his opponents by constantly mentioning that they are in possession of "your property" (see my PhD arguments re Lys. 28 etc.). Consider: "Ar. is rich, but he is hiding money which is now properly yours".

Demosthenes 54: *Against Konon*

Private lawcourt speech. Ariston (A.) was beaten almost to death by Konon (K.) and some of his friends, after a dispute in an army camp involving K's sons and A's slaves. A. prosecutes K. for battery (*aikēia*). The majority of the speech is told unemotionally, A. allowing the facts to speak for themselves. However, in the peroration:

- 42-44 A. asks the jury to feel anger and hatred against K. and his friends:
- if they jury-members were themselves injured, they would hate K., so they should feel anger for him (note: not hatred – you can only hate personal enemies or group enemies, not hate someone else's personal enemies)
 - this should not be regarded as a private matter (why not?)
 - now he asks for hatred for K. and his friends, on the grounds that they are brash and reckless, and at their trial are wicked and shameless, and have no regard for law – these are traits that are problematic for the group, hence K. & friends can be hated
- The jury should feel pity for A. not K.:
- K. would only be getting a just punishment, so should not be pitied
 - A. should be pitied as he has suffered terrible things, and not getting victory would add insult to injury
- A. aims to awaken some gratitude:
- he mentions his services to the city, in *praeteritio* – possibly because there is little except “trierarchies” (which seem to have been performed by his father, not him), serving in the army (as all citizens do, including K.) and “being useful”

The appeals to pity and gratitude seem pretty perfunctory, and merely testify to the “standardness” of such appeals.

The confusion of anger and hatred is interesting, given Aristotle's emphasis in separating them (Arist. *Rh.* 2.4.1382a1-19). However, I have attempted to suggest above reasons for the conflation and separation: someone who commits a personal injury would arouse anger and hatred in return from his victim; however, an onlooker might only feel anger on the victim's behalf, unless the perpetrator can be shown to have other antisocial qualities. Cf. Dem. 21. [Consider: is Aristotle's division correct? They frequently seem to be demanded by speakers in tandem. See Kurihara (2003) and Rubinstein (2004).]

Demosthenes 58: *Against Theokrines*

Private lawcourt speech. Epichares (E.) prosecutes Theokrines (Th.) for an allegedly false/malicious prosecution (*sykophantia*) of his father, leading to the latter's disenfranchisement.

62-65 E. attempts to arouse the jury's **hostility** to Th. by labelling him a *sykophantos* (someone who prosecutes maliciously for money – paid either by their opponent as a bribe not to prosecute, or sometimes by the city as a %-age of a fine paid by the opponent).

This hostility should be contrasted with that being aroused in e.g. Dem. 27, 38, 50, where the issue is to do with rich people's money not being spent on the city as it should, either by avoidance of liturgies or by squandering of patrimonies. I believe hostility involving issues of money is resentment / *phthonos*. The hostility here has nothing to do with money, but rather with a type of 'bad' person inimical to the democracy, and so I believe the emotion aimed at is **hatred** / *misos* (cf. hostility to sophists in Dem. 35).

Demosthenes 60: *Funeral Oration*

Epideictic 'funeral speech', given in honour of the war dead in the Battle of Chaironea (338 BCE).

- 25-26 A typical feature of Athenian funeral speeches, Demosthenes (D.) extols the benefits of their democratic system, an indication of civic **pride** in it:
- oligarchies produce **fear** (of those in power?) but no **sense of duty** (which by inference democracies must produce) – thus in war *saue qui peut* and the citizens act **shamefully**
 - democracies have freedom of speech, which always leads to truth (some tendentious arguments follow) – the implication is that a speaker can easily persuade a few (in an oligarchy) but not the many (in a democracy)
 - in a democracy people **fear** criticism and the **shame** of reprimand for doing wrong (if they are disgraced by running from battle), which leads them to courageous action in battle

We can note that both constitutions produce fear of those in power, though in oligarchies it is a fear of personal peril, while in democracies it is a fear of being shamed (but if those who run away in battle can be put to death (can they?), it would be a fear of peril too).

Worthington (2006) 33 n.36 notes there are similar arguments on fear of exposure in funeral speeches at Thuc. 2.37.3 and Hyp. 6.25.

Dinarchus 1: *Against Demosthenes*

Lawcourt speech. Demosthenes (Dem.), along with others, was accused of accepting a bribe from the imprisoned Harpalos to allow him to escape. The Areopagus court decided he had indeed received money. An anonymous prosecutor read this speech by Dinarchus (Din.), aiming to convict Dem. of treason.

No passages useful for the Oxford database, but the speech will be helpful in bolstering arguments made on passages in other speeches.

- 70-71 Din. discusses the property Dem. has, but does not refer to “our property”, nor any of the other means by which Lys. 27-29 attempts (in my view) to arouse resentment (*phthonos*) at embezzlement. This is because Dem. is not in possession of money that (supposedly) previously belonged to the city, or that was paid to him as representative of the city but disappeared into his own pocket; rather it was (allegedly) taken from a non-Athenian, and would never have been subject to Athenian control/ownership. The appropriate emotional response, then, is not **resentment** (*phthonos*), but rather **anger** at the treason, and **hatred** of the traitor, and he calls for these emotions as below.
- 77 The audience is urged to feel anger (*orgên*) at Dem. as a thief caught red-handed, and as a traitor.
- 81-82 There is criticism of Dem. in his capacity as an envoy (getting himself elected, and being absent from the city when it was in danger); see my PhD on popular resentment (*phthonos*) of ambassadors – though none is explicitly called for here. [This is separate from the theft/treason issue, which I argue above would not in itself arouse *phthonos*.] Cf. comment at §§ 88, 99 on the orators (as a class) selling themselves and taking bribes; at §107 Din. calls for hatred (*miseite*), not resentment (*phthonos*), for betraying the city for money.
- 92 Din. calls for hatred (*misoumen*) against base people (*ponêrous*) and bribe-takers (*dôrôdokous*); cf. §107. Dem. and the others accused are the people’s enemies (§113: *ekhthrois*).

Dinarchus 2 (*Against Aristogeiton*) and 3 (*Against Philokles*)

Cf. calls for anger (*orgê*) and hatred (*miseite*) at Din. 2.4.

Cf. calls for anger (*orgên*) at Din. 3.8 and for hatred (*misein*) at Din. 3.19.

Hyperides 5: *Against Demosthenes*

Private lawcourt speech, 323 BCE (Harpalos affair – cf. Dinarchus 1-3).

- 22-25 You have a right to be angry, because Dem. should be behaving as a teacher of moral virtue at his age, not being tried for bribery. He has (effectively) betrayed your trust. I myself was friends with Dem. but *he* broke that friendship by changing sides – sc. he should likewise be deemed to have broken any admiring or grateful feelings towards him. Therefore you are justified in punishing him.
- 28 We should be grateful to Lycurgus, and we are.
- consider instances of *charis* and *eunoia*